Appeal details
Counselvise Citation
[2022] 101 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 3369 (ITAT-AHMEDABAD)
Assessee PAN
Bench
Appeal Number
Duration Of Justice
9 year(s) 11 month(s) 12 day(s)
Appellant
Respondent
Appeal Type
Income Tax Appeal
Pronouncement Date
14-11-2022
Appeal Filed By
Assessee
Order Result
Allowed
Bench Allotted
Ahmedabad
Next Hearing Date
14-11-2022
Assessment Year
2017-2018
Appeal Filed On
02-12-2012
Judgement Text
"आयकर अपीलीय अिधकरण, ’सी’ \u0001यायपीठ, चे\tई। \nIN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL \n‘C’ BENCH: CHENNAI \n \n\u0001ी मंजूनाथा. जी, लेखा सद\t एवं \n\fी मनोमोहनदास, \u0011ाियक सद\u0015 क\nे सम\u0017 \nBEFORE SHRI MANJUNATHA. G, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER \nAND SHRI MANOMOHAN DAS, JUDICIAL MEMBER \n \nआयकर अपील सं./ITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \nिनधा\u000eरण वष\u000e/Assessment Years: 2015-16 & 2016-17 \nM/s.Enrica Enterprises Pvt. Ltd., \nNo.85, Matruvazhi Salai, \n(Bypass Road), Poonamallee, \nChennai-600 056. \n[PAN: AAACE 9199 F] \nv. \nThe Dy. Commissioner of – \n Income Tax, \nCentral Circle-3(4), \nChennai. \n(अपीलाथ\u0016/Appellant) \n (\u0017\u0018यथ\u0016/Respondent) \n \nअपीलाथ\u0016 क\u001a ओर से/ Appellant by \n: \nShri D. Anand, Adv. \n\u0017\u0018यथ\u0016 क\u001a ओर से /Respondent by \n: \nShri R. Clement Ramesh – \n Kumar, CIT \nसुनवाई क\u001a तारीख/Date of Hearing \n: \n13.02.2024 \nघोषणा क\u001a तारीख /Date of Pronouncement \n: \n06.03.2024 \n \n \nआदेश / O R D E R \n \nPER MANJUNATHA. G, AM: \n \n \nThese two appeals filed by the assessee are directed against \nseparate, but identical orders of the Commissioner of Income Tax \n(Appeals)-20, Chennai, dated 17.08.2023 and pertains to assessment \nyears 2015-16 & 2016-17. Since, facts are identical and issues are \ncommon, for the sake of convenience, these appeals were heard together \nand are being disposed off, by this consolidated order. \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 2 :: \n \n2. \nThe assessee has, more or less, raised common grounds of appeal \nfor both the assessment years. Therefore, for the sake of brevity, grounds \nof appeal filed for the AY 2015-16, are re-produced as under: \n1. The order of the learned Commissioner Of Income (Appeals)-20, is wrong, \nillegal and is opposed to law. The learned Commissioner (Appeals) erred in \nlaw and on facts in confirming the action of learned assessing officer in \nlevying penalty under section 271(l)(c). \n2. The learned Commissioner Of Income (Appeals)-20 ought to have seen \nthat the appellant has neither furnished inaccurate particulars of income nor \nhas concealed the particulars of income warranting levy of penalty under \nsection 271(1)(C). \n3. The learned CIT(A)-20 ought to have seen that the penalty proceedings is \ndeemed to have been initiated only with the issue of notice under section 274 \nr.w.s 271(1)(C) and that the said notice should specifically state the reasons \nfor levy of penalty. Failure on the part of the AO to specifically state the \nreasons under which limb the penalty is levied would tantamount to failure to \nrecord satisfaction as well as non-application of mind thereby making the said \nlevy illegal and opposed to law. In the instant case the penalty notice suffers \nfrom aforesaid infirmity. \n4. The learned CIT(A) ought to have seen that the discretion to impose \npenalty must be exercised judicially. The learned CIT(A) failed to see that \naddition made in the assessment order is on ad hoc basis, based on \nestimated disallowances of portion of marketing expense and based on \nsurrender of income not backed by any incriminating material. It is not a case \nof which either the appellant or the investigation team had any evidence as to \nthe quantum of inflated expenditure warranting levy of penalty under section \n271(1)(C). \n5. The learned CIT(A) failed to see that in the instant case addition is made \nby the assessing officer merely based on income surrendered by the appellant \nand not based on any incriminating material warranting levy of penalty. \nNeither the appellant nor the investigation team had any evidence as to the \nquantum of inflated expenditure year wise. \n6. The learned CIT(A) failed to see that the AO while levying penalty under \nsection 271(1)(C) placed undue reliance on section 271AAB of the Act. \n7. The learned CIT(A) ought to have seen that the impugned penalty has \nbeen levied based on non-application of mind and legalities therein. The \npenalty in the impugned assessment year has been levied for underreporting \nof income while the concept of underreporting of income is applicable only \nfrom AY: 2017-18. \n8. The learned CIT(A) failed to see that in the instant case the quantum \nassessment is completed based on ad hoc disallowances estimating \ndisallowances of portion of marketing expense and based on surrender of \nincome not backed by any incriminating material which would neither mean \nthat the assessee has concealed any income or furnished inaccurate \nparticulars warranting levy of penalty. \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 3 :: \n \n9. The learned Commissioner (Appeals) erred in law and on facts in \nconfirming the action of learned assessing officer in levying penalty under \nsection 271(l)(c). The learned 1st appellate authority failed to see that the \npenalty proceedings are independent of assessment proceedings and \ntherefore penalty is not leviable merely on the ground that certain additions \nhave been made in the assessment proceedings. \n10. \nThe learned Commissioner ought to have seen that penalty cannot be \nlevied merely because an amount taxed as income as held by HonTDle \nSupreme Court in the case of M/s Hindustan Steel Ltd. vs State of Orissa \n(1972) 83 ITR 26(SC) and decision of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Escorts \nFinance Ltd. (2009) 226 CTR (Del) 105. \nFor these and other grounds that may be rendered at the time of hearing it is \nmost humbly prayed that the Hon'ble Tribunal may be pleased to allow the \nappellants appeal and thus render justice. \n \n3. \nThe brief facts of the case are that the assessee, M/s. Enrica \nEnterprises Pvt. Ltd., is engaged in the business of manufacture and sale \nof Indian Made Foreign Liquor (IMFL) and it is one of the prime suppliers \nto M/s.Tamilnadu State Marketing Corporation Ltd (TASMAC). A search \nand seizure operation u/s.132 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (in short “the \nAct“), was conducted at the premise of the assessee on 06.12.2018. \nDuring the course of search, a sum of Rs.55,27,70,000/- of unaccounted \ncash was found and seized from the residential premise of Shri \nM.Kothandarami Reddy as well as six individuals who identified \nthemselves as associates of the assessee and claimed that they have held \nthe cash for and on behalf of the assessee. The amount of cash seized \nduring the course of search and seizure on 06.12.20128 in the residential \npremise of Shri. M.Kothandarmi Reddy and others was tabulated in Page \nNo.2 of the assessment order. In the course of search, a sworn statement \nu/s.132(4) of the Act, was recorded from Shri S.D.Rami Reddy, working \nDirector of the assessee company and in response to Q.Nos.17 & 18, he \nhas explained the modus operandi of generation of cash found and seized \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 4 :: \n \nduring the course of search and also admitted a sum of Rs.113.99 Crs. as \nadditional income for the period from 01.04.2014 to 06.12.2018 which \nincludes cash seizure of Rs.55.27 Crs. The Director of the assessee \ncompany has also explained the modus operandi of generation of \nunaccounted cash by way of inflated expenditure booked under the head \nmarketing expenses being ‘gift articles’ and admitted that on an average \n1/3rd of actual expenditure accounted in the books of accounts, has been \nreceived back in cash from the suppliers. The relevant question and \nanswers in the statement recorded u/s.132(4) of the Act, from Shri \nS.D.Rami Reddy, was reproduced as under: \n\"Q.17. While answering to Q.6, in your sworn statement recorded under \nsection 132(4) dated 9.12.2018, while asking the modus operandi of \ngenerating unaccounted cash, you have stated that you will raise bogus \nbills for which you pay them through banking channels and receive cash \nfrom them. Please go through your statement and clarify about generation \nof unaccounted cash. \nAns. Sir, we have not raised any bogus bills from our suppliers of gift \narticles to generate unaccounted cash. However, we received back one \nthird of the invoice value on an average in the form of cash from our gift \narticle suppliers. Since this amounts to inflation of the expenditure in our \nbooks of account, we undertake to withdraw of claim towards expenditure \nin the respective years. \n \nQ:18. Please furnish the quantity of cash generated invoice-wise and party \n-wise with details of suppliers? \nAns. Sir I don't have the invoice-wise and party -wise details of cash \ngenerated. However, I am here by submitting year-wise details of cash \ngenerated on this account as under – \n \nS.No. \nFinancial Year \nAmount in Crores \n1 \n2014-15 \n16.39 \n2 \n2015-16 \n23.62 \n3 \n2016-17 \n15.79 \n4 \n2017-18 \n25.73 \n5 \n2013-19 \n32.46 \n \n113.99 \n \n \n \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 5 :: \n \nHowever, no corroborative evidence to the sworn statement was unearthed \nduring search. \n \n4. \nConsequent to search proceedings, the cases were taken up for \nassessment proceedings. In response to notice issued u/s 153A of the \nAct, by the AO for both the assessment years, the assessee has filed its \nreturn \nof \nincome \non \n23.11.2020 \nadmitting \na \ntotal \nincome \nof \nRs.7,92,44,724/- and Rs.14,52,34,049/- which includes additional income \noffered during the course of search towards inflated expenditure. In the \nreturn of income filed for AYs 2015-16 & 2016-17, the assessee company \nhas offered additional income of Rs.16.39 Crs. & Rs.23.62 Crs. \nrespectively towards additional income offered during the course of \nsearch on account of inflated expenditure under the head marketing \nexpenses being purchase of ‘gift articles’. During the course of \nassessment proceedings, on enquiry with the suppliers of gift articles, \nreplies were received from the suppliers of gift articles along with account \ncopy as reflected in the books of the assessee, where, all of them stated \nto have supplied gift articles to the assessee, but some of them also \nstated that the assessee took back some cash at times. The AO \ncompleted the assessment u/s.143(3) r.w.s.153A of the Act on \n26.07.2021, accepting the additional income voluntarily offered by the \nassessee towards inflated expenditure under the head ‘gift articles’. \nWhile completing the assessment, the AO observed that after considering \nrelevant submissions of the assessee, the income offered by the assessee, \nincluding estimated disallowance of portion of marketing expenses, is \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 6 :: \n \nfound to be in order and accepted. The relevant submissions of the \nassessee and findings of the AO are reproduced as under: \nIn continuation to the above, during assessment proceedings, assessee \nclaimed that no corroborative evidence to the sworn statement w.r.t. \nfound/seized materials was unearthed so as to suggest the culpability of \ntax evasion. \nAfter going through the circumstances in entirety. The income offered by \nthe assessee, including the estimated disallowance of portion of marketing \nexpenses, is found to be in order and accepted. \n \n5. \nAlong with the assessment order dated 26.07.2021 for both \nassessment years, the AO initiated penalty proceedings u/s.271(1)(c) of \nthe Act and notice u/s.274 r.w.s.271(1)(C) of the Act, dated 26.07.2021 \nwas issued and served on the assessee. In the said show cause notice, in \nbold letters, the AO stated that ‘it appears to me that you have concealed \nthe particulars of income or furnished inaccurate particulars of such \nincome and thus, called upon the assessee to show cause ‘as to why’ \npenalty u/s.271(1)(C) of the Act, cannot be imposed. In response to \nshow cause notice, the assessee vide letter dated 07.08.2021 raised its \nobjection on notice issued u/s.274 r.w.s.271(1)(C) of the Act and also \nfiled its explanation why penalty cannot be imposed u/s.271(1)(C) of the \nAct in the given facts and circumstances of the case. The assessee \nfurther submitted that it has neither concealed the particulars of income \nnor furnished inaccurate particulars of income, which is evident from the \nassessment order passed by the AO, where the AO has accepted \nexplanations furnished by the assessee with regard to additional income \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 7 :: \n \noffered during the course of search towards inflated expenditure under \nthe head ‘marketing expenses’. \n6. \nThe AO after considering relevant submissions of the assessee and \nalso taken note of various facts observed that the assessee has \ndeliberately and knowingly appropriating concealed amount of cash from \nthe business and stored in the residential premise of employees and \nrelatives. From the above, it is clearly evident that unaccounted income \ngenerated by the assessee by inflated expenditure under the head \n‘marketing expenses’ was unearthed only because of search action \nconducted on 06.12.2018. Unless action has been taken by conducting \nsearch, the assessee would have continued the practice of evasive \nmethodology and caused huge loss to the Revenue. Therefore, the \nAssessing Officer opined that admission of additional income and payment \nof taxes does not absorb the assessee from penalty proceedings. \nTherefore, rejected arguments of the assessee and levied penalty \nu/s.271(1)(c) of the Act, amounting to Rs.5,67,22,512/- which is \nequivalent to 100% tax sought to be adopted. The relevant findings of \nthe AO are as under: \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 8 :: \n \n \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 9 :: \n \n \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 10 :: \n \n \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 11 :: \n \n \n7. \nBeing aggrieved by the penalty order, the assessee preferred an \nappeal before the Ld.CIT (A). Before the Ld.CIT (A), the assessee \nchallenged the penalty order passed by the AO u/s.271(1)(c) of the Act, \nin light of show cause notice issued u/s.274 r.w.s.271(1)(C) of the Act, \ndated 26/11/2021 and argued that, in absence of proper satisfaction \nrecorded by the AO and also show cause ‘as to why’ penalty proceedings \nare initiated, the AO cannot levy penalty u/s.271(1)(c) of the Act. The \nassessee has also challenged penalty levied on estimated addition \ntowards additional income offered by the assessee for inflated \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 12 :: \n \nexpenditure under the head ‘marketing expenses’ on the ground that \nallocation of additional income for both assessment years was only on ad \nhoc basis and there was no evidence with the AO as regards ‘concealment \nof particulars of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income’. \n8. \nThe Ld.CIT(A) after considering relevant submissions of the \nassessee and also taken note of certain judicial precedents, including the \ndecision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of MAK Data Pvt. Ltd. \nv. CIT-II [2013] 358 ITR 593 (SC) held that going by the facts and \ncircumstances of the present case, the assessee case gets covered by \nExplanation-5(A), where any income based on any entry in any books of \naccounts or other documents or transaction and assessee claims that such \nentry in the books of accounts or other documents or transactions \nrepresents his income for any previous year which has ended before the \ndate of search and return of income for such previous year, has been \nfurnished before the said date, but such income has not been declared, \nthen, notwithstanding that such income declared by him in any return of \nincome furnished on or after the date of search, he shall for the purpose \nof imposition of penalty u/s.271(1)(c) of the Act, be deemed to have \nconcealed the particulars of income or furnished inaccurate particulars of \nincome. The Ld.CIT(A) had discussed the issue at length in light of \ngrounds of appeal filed by the assessee and negated ground taken by the \nassessee on the issue of show cause notice issued by the AO u/s.274 \nr.w.s.271(1)(c) of the Act. The Ld.CIT(A) had also discussed the issue in \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 13 :: \n \nlight of additional income offered by the assessee during the course of \nsearch coupled with enquiries conducted with suppliers of gift articles \nduring the course of assessment proceedings, and observed that the \nsuppliers have confirmed the fact of cash received back by the assessee \nand from the above, it is undoubtedly clear that the assessee is in the \nhabit of inflating expenditure and receiving 1/3rd of cash back from the \nsuppliers. Further, this fact has been strengthened from the seizure of \ncash during the course of search, where the Department has seized huge \namount of unaccounted cash from the residential premise of the Director \nand their associates and also confirmed generation of unaccounted cash \nby employing the modus operandi of booking expenditure and receiving \ncash from the suppliers. Therefore, rejected arguments of the assessee \nand penalty levied by the AO t u/s.271(1)(c) of the Act. Aggrieved by the \norder of the Ld.CIT(A), the assessee is in appeal before us. \n9. \nThe Ld. Counsel for the assessee, Shri D. Anand, Advocate, \nreferring to show cause notice issued u/s.274 r.w.s.271(1)(c) of the Act \ndated 26.07.2021 submitted that, the AO has issued a printed form of \nshow cause notice without specifying under which limb the assessee is \ncharged to levy penalty u/s.271(1)(c) of the Act, which shows non-\napplication of mind by the AO. The Ld. Counsel for the assessee further \nsubmitted that the AO should arrive at a clear satisfaction and such \nsatisfaction should be discernable from the assessment order itself. \nFurther, show-cause notice issued by the AO should clearly spelt out the \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 14 :: \n \ncharge, on which, he proposed to initiate penalty proceedings. Issuing \nprinted form of notice without specifying the charge, i.e. whether penalty \nproceedings has been initiated for ‘concealment of particulars of income \nor furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income’ vitiates the entire \nproceedings, including consequent order passed by the AO imposing \npenalty u/s.271(1)(C) of the Act. The Ld.Counsel for the assessee \nreferring to the plethora of judicial precedents, including the decision of \nthe Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. SSA’s Emerald Meadows \nreported in [2016] 73 taxmann.com 241 submitted that non-specifying \nthe specific charge in the show-cause notice would vitiates the penalty \nproceedings. In the present case, the assessment order is silent about \nsatisfaction arrived at by the AO about ‘concealment of particulars of \nincome or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income’ which is evident \nfrom the assessment order dated 26.07.2021, where the AO stated that \npenalty proceedings u/s.271(1)(c) of the Act, is being initiated separately. \nThe said lapse is even continued in show cause notice issued by the AO \nnotice u/s.274 r.w.s.271(1)(c) of the Act, where the AO has issued \nprinted form of show cause notice without striking of inapplicable portion \nof the notice. From the above, it is undoubtedly clear that the AO has not \nrecorded \nsatisfaction \nbefore \ninitiation \nof \npenalty \nproceedings \nu/s.271(1)(c) of the Act. In this regard, he relied upon the decision of \nthe Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. SSA’s Emerald \nMeadows(supra) and also the decision of the Hon’ble Karnataka High \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 15 :: \n \nCourt in the case of CIT v. Manjunatha Cotton & Ginning Factory reported \nin [2013] 359 ITR 565 (Karnataka). The assessee had also relied upon \nthe decision of ITAT Chennai Bench in the case of Shri Mahaveer chand \nJain in ITA No.912/Chny/2020 order dated 13.05.2022. \n10. \nThe Ld.Counsel for the assessee further submitted that the \nLd.CIT(A) erred in sustaining the penalty levied by the AO u/s.271(1)(c) \nof the Act, without appreciating the fact that the assessee neither \nconcealed the particulars of income nor furnished inaccurate particulars of \nincome warranting levy of penalty u/s.271(1)(C) of the Act. The \nLd.Counsel for the assessee further submitted that if you go through the \nassessment order passed by the AO, the AO clearly admitted the fact that \nthere is no corroborative evidence to the sworn statement with reference \nto the material unearthed during the course of search which suggest \n‘concealment of particulars of income or furnishing of inaccurate \nparticulars of income’. The AO has made addition towards additional \nincome on estimated disallowance of portion of marketing expenses based \non statement recorded from the director of Assessee Company during the \ncourse of search. Except this, there is no evidence with the AO to allege \nthat the assessee has concealed the particulars of income or furnished \ninaccurate particulars of income, which warrants levy of penalty \nu/s.271(1)(C) of the Act. The Ld.Counsel for the assessee further \nreferring to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of \nHindustan Steel Ltd., v. State of Orissa [1972] 83 ITR 26 and also the \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 16 :: \n \ndecision of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Escorts \nFinance Ltd. [2009] 226 CTR 105 (Del) submitted that penalty cannot be \nlevied merely because amount taxed as income. In the instant case, \nquantum assessment is completed based on ad-hoc disallowance on \nestimating portion of marketing expenses and based on surrender of \nincome by the assessee, but not backed by any incriminating material \nwhich would neither mean that the assessee has neither concealed the \nparticulars of income nor furnished inaccurate particulars of income. \nTherefore, he submitted that penalty levied by the AO and sustained by \nthe Ld.CIT(A) should be deleted. \n11. \nThe Ld.DR, Shri. R. Clement Ramesh Kumar CIT, on the other hand, \nsupporting the order of the Ld.CIT(A), submitted that it is an admitted \nfact that during the course of search huge amount of unaccounted cash \nwas found and seized from the residential premise of the assessee \nDirector and their associates. Further, they have admitted additional \nincome towards inflated expenditure under the head ‘marketing expenses’ \nwhich is further backed by the enquiries conducted during the course of \nassessment proceedings, where the suppliers have admitted to have \nreturned 1/3rd of cash to the assessee. Based on the admission of the \nassessee coupled with enquiries conducted during the course of search, a \nstatement was recorded from the working Director of the assessee, where \nhe has explained modus operandi of generation of unaccounted income \nand further admitted additional income of Rs.113.99 Crs. towards \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 17 :: \n \ndisallowance of marketing expenses. Had search been not conducted in \nthe case of the assessee, the modus operandi of the assessee and \ngeneration of unaccounted income was gone unnoticed. Therefore, the \narguments of the assessee that it has not furnished inaccurate particulars \nof income or concealment of particulars of income, is incorrect. The Ld.DR \nfurther submitted that the assessee has challenged show-cause notice \nissued by the AO and also raised its objection before the AO. The AO has \nclarified and also disposed off objection raised by the assessee which is \nevident from the penalty order passed by the AO, where the AO has \nclearly stated that penalty proceedings has been initiated for concealment \nof income. Therefore, there is no merit in grounds taken by the assessee \nin light of notice issued by the AO and thus, arguments of the assessee \nshould be rejected. \n12. \nWe have heard both the parties, perused the materials available on \nrecord and gone through orders of the authorities below. The provisions \nof Sec.271(1)(c) of the Act, provides for levy of penalty for ‘concealment \nof particulars of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income’. \nIf you go by the provisions of Sec.271(1)(c) of the Act, there are two \ncharges, for which, penalty can be levied. (i) ‘Concealment of particulars \nof income and (ii) Furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income’. This is \nfurther fortified by the provisions of Sec.274 of the Act, and as per said \nprovision, no order imposing penalty under this chapter shall be made \nunless, the assessee has been heard or has been given a reasonable \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 18 :: \n \nopportunity of being heard. From the conjoint reading of section \n271(1)(c) r.w.s.274 of the Act, it is undisputedly clear that charge must \nbe precise and imposing of penalty only on that footing. Therefore, before \ndeciding the issue of penalty levied u/s.271(1)(c) of the Act, in light of \nshow cause notice issued by the AO u/s.274 r.w.s.271(1)(c) of the Act \ndated 26.07.2021, one has to examine the assessment order passed by \nthe AO and show cause notice issued by the AO u/s.274 r.w.s.271(1)(c) \nof the Act and consequent penalty order passed by the AO. \n13. \nIt is an admitted legal position that before initiating penalty, the \nassessee must be apprised of the precise charge brought against the \nassessee. The assessee must be told distinctly whether he has held guilty \nof having concealed the particulars of income or furnished inaccurate \nparticulars of income. Section 274(1) provides for reasonable opportunity \nto be given to the assessee so that he can meet the charge. Therefore, \nfrom the above, it is very clear that the satisfaction arrived at by the AO \nbefore charging the assessee on particular limb of u/s.271(1)(c) of the \nAct, the AO must clearly record his satisfaction and such satisfaction \nshould discernable from the assessment order itself. This is because, if \npenalty proceedings are commenced against the assessee on a particular \nfooting which is concealment of particulars of income, but finally levy of \npenalty is based on a different footing altogether i.e. on the footing of \ninaccurate particulars of income is not only deprived of the right of the \nassessee to face the charge before the authority but also violates \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 19 :: \n \nprinciples of natural justice. It cannot be said that in such circumstances, \nthe assessee had been given a reasonable opportunity of hearing before \nthe order imposing penalty was passed. Therefore, before initiating \npenalty proceedings, the AO should record clear satisfaction in the \nassessment order itself and specify under which limb he proposed to \ninitiate penalty proceedings u/s.271(1)(c) of the Act. In case, there is no \nclear satisfaction as required under the law in the assessment order, but \nat least such satisfaction should be discernable from the show cause \nnotice issued by the AO u/s.274 r.w.s.271(1)(c) of the Act. Issuing \nprinted form of notice without specifying a particular charge, i.e. whether \npenalty proceedings are initiated for ‘concealment of particulars of income \nor furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income’, the assessee cannot be \ngiven at notice of particular charge so that it can meet the charge. Thus, \nthe basis of the issuance of notice should remain same while imposing \npenalty. If the notice is issued in the context of concealment of income, \nthen, the penalty cannot be levied by shifting basis to inaccuracy of \nparticulars. This is to ensure that the assessee gets an adequate \nopportunity in respect of default which is detected and alleged against the \nassessee and which forms the basis for issuance of notice u/s.271(1)(c) of \nthe Act and to ensure that the assessee is not put to peril of answering \nagainst something which individual specifically determined as his default \nor in respect of which no notice issued by the Officer which satisfaction \nalone matters at the stage of the initiation of the proceedings. This legal \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 20 :: \n \nposition is clearly explained by the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka in the \ncase of CIT v. Manjunatha Cotton & Ginning Factory reported in 88 \ntaxaman.com 133, where, it has been clearly held that existence of \ncondition stipulated u/s.271(1)(c) of the Act, is a sine qua non for \ninitiation of proceedings u/s.271(1)(c) of the Act. The existence of such \nconditions should be discernable from the assessment order or order of \nthe appellate authority or revisional authority. Even, if there is no specific \nfinding regarding the existence of the conditions u/s.271(1)(c) of the Act, \nat least the facts set out in Explanation-1A & 1B should be discernable \nfrom the order which is by legal fiction constitutes concealment because \nof deeming provision. Even if these conditions do not exist in the \nassessment \norder, \nat \nleast \na \ndirection \nto \ninitiate \nproceedings \nu/s.271(1)(c) of the Act, is a sine qua non for the AO to initiate the \nproceedings, because of deeming provision contained in sec.1B. The \nHon’ble High Court further held that notice u/s.274 of the Act should \nspecifically stated the ground mentioned in s.271(1)(c) of the Act i.e. \nwhether it is for ‘concealment of particulars of income or furnishing of \ninaccurate particulars of income’., Sending a printed form of notice with \ngrounds mentioned in Sec.271(1)(c) of the Act would not specific \nrequirement of law. This legal position is re-affirmed by the Hon’ble \nSupreme Court in the case of CIT v. SSA’s Emerald Meadows 73 \nTaxmann.com 248 (SC), where the Hon’ble Supreme Court dismissed the \nSLP against the order of the Hon’ble High Court which in turn upheld the \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 21 :: \n \ndecision rendered by the Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT v. \nManjunatha Cotton & Ginning Factory (supra). A similar view has been \nexpressed by the larger Bench of Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case \nof Mohd. Farhan A.Shaikh vs. DCIT 125 taxmann.com 253, wherein it has \nbeen clearly held that where vagueness and ambiguity in the notice can \ndemonstrate non-application of mind by the authority and/or ultimate \nprejudice to the right of opportunity of hearing contemplated u/s.274 of \nthe Act. \n14. \nIn this legal back ground, if you examine the facts of the present \ncase, there is no dispute with regard to the fact that there is no \nsatisfaction from the AO in the assessment order which is clearly evident \nfrom the assessment order passed by the AO, where the AO simply \ninitiated penalty proceedings u/s.271(1)(c) of the Act, without specifying \na particular charge on the assessee i.e. whether it is ‘concealment of \nparticulars of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income’ and \nsaid lapse even continued in show cause notice issued u/s.274 \nr.w.s.271(1)(c) of the Act, where the AO has issued a printed form of \nnotice without striking of inapplicable portion of the notice. From the \nabove, it is very clear that the AO has not arrived at satisfaction whether \npenalty is initiated for ‘concealment of particulars of income or furnishing \nof inaccurate particulars of income’. In absence of proper notice, it \ncannot be said that the AO has applied his mined to relevant facts and \nalso arrived at satisfaction that the assessee has concealed the particulars \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 22 :: \n \nof income or furnished inaccurate particulars of income. In absence of \nspecific charge under which limb the penalty proceedings has been \ninitiated, the AO cannot levy penalty u/s.271(1)(c) of the Act. In our \nconsidered view, penalty proceedings initiated u/s.271(1)(c) of the Act by \nissuing a vague notice u/s.274 r.w.s.271(1)(c) of the Act, vitiates the \nwhole proceedings, including consequent penalty order passed by the AO \nand thus, order passed by the Assessing Officer imposing penalty u/s \n271(1)(c) on the basis of invalid notice cannot be sustained under the \nlaw. \n15. \nAt this stage, it is relevant to consider various case laws relied upon \nby the Ld.Counsel for the assessee. The Ld.Counsel for the assessee has \nrelied upon the decision of the Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court of Madras \nin the case of Babuji Jacob v. ITO reported in [2021] 430 ITR 259 \n(Madras). The Hon’ble Madras High Court after considering its earlier \ndecision in the case of Sudaram Finance Ltd. v. ACIT reported in [2018] \n93 taxmann.com 250, has held that penalty levied u/s.271(1)(c) of the \nAct, consequent to vague/defect notice issued u/s.274 r.w.s.271(1)(c) of \nthe Act, cannot be sustained under the law. The relevant findings of the \nHon’ble High Court are as under: \n18. The first aspect is as to whether there is any concealment of \nparticulars of the assessee's income. At the first instance i.e. during the \nscrutiny assessment, the assessee sent a letter dated 15.3.2016 \nexplaining the entire transaction wherein he had stated that while filing \nthe return of income, he was under the impression that both the \nproperties were agricultural lands and that there was no tax liability. \nConsequently, since one of the properties namely the property at Egattur \nVillage was treated to be a capital asset, the long term capital gains were \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 23 :: \n \ncomputed and the assessee requested for deduction under Section 54F of \nthe Act, as the sale consideration received was utilized for purchase of a \nnew flat, in which, the name of the assessee's wife was also included as a \npurchaser. The assessee further stated about the sale of livestock and \nstanding crops. The assessee also stated that he is a senior citizen \ncarrying on agricultural operations for 27 years and that his income was \nbased upon the interest received from bank deposits and offered that a \nsum of Rs.50 lakhs may be treated as revenue in nature and taxed as \nincome though there was no positive fact or finding had been found so as \nto avoid protracted litigation. \n19. Further, with regard to deposits, the assessee explained that he had \nreceived the amount of Rs.21,56,250/- towards development cost of the \nagricultural land and a copy of the letter acknowledging payment made \nby the party was produced. This amount was received by RTGS to his \nbank account and the buyer had confirmed in writing that this was paid as \ndevelopment cost. Hence, this amount related to sale consideration of the \nland. \n20. This explanation, which was offered by the assessee, did not find \nfavour with the Assessing Officer, who rejected the same and completed \nthe assessment vide order dated 30.3.2016 under Section 143(3) of the \nAct and made additions as mentioned above. Thus, there was no \nallegation in the assessment under Section 143(3) of the Act that there \nhad been concealment of particulars of income. \n21. Admittedly, all the amounts were received by the assessee through \nbanking channels and he had mentioned about the same in his return of \nincome. The only mistake done by the assessee was to treat both the \nlands as agricultural lands. Once the notice under Section 143(3) of the \nAct was issued, the assessee was able to convince the Assessing Officer \nthat the lands in Pudhupakkam Village were to be treated as agricultural \nlands. But, he was unable to convince the Assessing Officer that the lands \nin Egattur Village were agricultural lands, which were treated to be a \ncapital asset. Therefore, there was no material available with the \nAssessing Officer to allege concealment of particulars of income. \n22. With regard to furnishing of inaccurate particulars, the stand taken by \nthe assessee was that both lands were agricultural lands, that he had \nbeen carrying on agricultural operations for 27 years, that he had been \nfiling return of income regularly and that the source of income was from \nagricultural income and interest income from bank deposits. These facts \nwere never disputed by the Assessing Officer. \n23. After receipt of the penalty notice, the assessee submitted a reply \ndated 11.4.2016 wherein the assessee reiterated the stand taken in his \nletter dated 15.3.2016. However, the same was not accepted by the \nAssessing Officer while completing the assessment under Section 143(3) \nof the Act. The assessee further stated that he had produced all the facts \nof the transactions namely sale documents, materials, etc., before the \nAssessing Officer and therefore, it cannot be construed as furnishing of \ninaccurate particulars. The assessee also pointed out that while allowing \nexemption under Section 54F of the Act, the Assessing Officer considered \n50% of the investments whereas 100% investments were done through \nbanking channels. Therefore, the assessee stated that it cannot be said \nthat correct particulars of income were not furnished. The assessee \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 24 :: \n \nfurther pointed out that he was in need of funds for purchase of a new \nflat, that he sold trees with roots, coconut seedling and other \nmiscellaneous items, that the farming sector was an unorganized sector, \nthat all were sold to agriculturists and that he cannot be compelled to \nfurnish details in this regard. The assessee furthermore pointed out that \nfull particulars such as bank statements, cash deposit out of accumulated \nincome were fully disclosed and furnished to the Assessing Officer, that \nthere was no non disclosure, that the explanation offered was bona fide \nand that therefore, penalty could not be imposed. \n24. The Assessing Officer, while imposing penalty vide order dated \n28.9.2016, held that but for the scrutiny assessment under Section \n143(3) of the Act, the cash deposits would not have come to light and \ntherefore, rendered a finding that the assessee furnished inaccurate \nparticulars. \n25. This finding of the Assessing Officer is incorrect because while \ncompleting the assessment under Section 143(3) of the Act, there was no \nallegation against the assessee as to furnishing of inaccurate particulars. \nBut, the Assessing Officer did not accept the explanation offered by the \nassessee and made certain additions, which will not automatically result \nin interpreting the same as furnishing of inaccurate particulars. Further, \nwe find that there is no specific finding as regards the concealment \nagainst the assessee because, on facts, it has been established before the \nAssessing Officer while completing the assessment under Section 143(3) \nof the Act that all transactions were through banking channels. Hence, \nthe argument of Mrs.R.Hemalatha, learned Senior Standing Counsel \nappearing for the Revenue that both limbs of Section 271(1)(c) of the Act \nare attracted has to necessarily fall. Hence, we hold that there is inherent \ndefect in the notice dated 30.3.2016 issued under Section 271(1)(c) of \nthe Act, as it will vitiate the entire proceedings. \n26. Since we have heard the learned counsel on the correctness of the \norders passed by the Assessing Officer, the CIT(A) and the Tribunal on \nthe merits of the matter, we proceed to discuss the other issues as well. \n27. The CIT(A), while confirming the order of penalty, took note of the \norder passed by the Assessing Officer wherein the Assessing Officer \nrejected the explanation offered by the assessee, which ultimately \nresulted in an addition and the assessment was completed vide order \ndated 30.3.2016. The question would be as to whether rejection of the \nexplanation and the consequential addition would automatically result in \nan order of penalty. \n28. Mrs.R.Hemalatha, learned Senior Standing Counsel appearing for the \nRevenue seeks to substantiate her case by relying upon the decision of \nthe Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mak Data (P) Ltd. Vs. CIT, II \n[reported in (2013) 38 Taxmann.com 448] wherein it was held that \nvoluntary disclosure does not release the assessee from mischief of \npenalty proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act and in terms of \nthe said provision, the Assessing Officer has to satisfy as to whether the \npenalty proceedings have to be initiated or not during the course of \nassessment proceedings and he is not required to record his satisfaction \nin a particular manner or reduce it into writing. \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 25 :: \n \n29. Reliance is also placed on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court \nin the case of K.P.Madhusudhanan Vs. CIT [reported in (2001) 118 \nTaxman 324]. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of \nMak Data (P) Ltd., was taken note of by the Division Bench of this Court, \nto which, one of us (TSSJ) was a party, in the case of CIT, Chennai-IV Vs. \nGem Granites (Karnataka) [reported in (2014) 42 Taxmann.com 493] and \nthe aspect as to how onus/burden of proof shifts from the assessee to the \nRevenue when penalty proceedings are initiated, is held in the following \nterms : \n“11. In a recent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil \nAppeal No.9772 of 2013, dated 30.10.2013 (Mak Data P. Ltd., vs. \nCommissioner of Income Tax-II), the Hon'ble Supreme Court while \nconsidering the Explanation to Section 271(1), held that the \nquestion would be whether the assessee had offered an \nexplanation for concealment of particulars of income or furnishing \ninaccurate particulars of income and the Explanation to Section \n271(1) raises a presumption of concealment, when a difference is \nnoticed by the Assessing Officer between the reported and \nassessed income. The burden is then on the assessee to show \notherwise, by cogent and reliable evidence and when the initial \nonus placed by the explanation, has been discharged by the \nassessee, the onus shifts on the Revenue to show that the amount \nin question constituted their income and not otherwise. Factually, \nwe find that the onus cast upon the assessee has been discharged \nby giving a cogent and reliable explanation. Therefore, if the \ndepartment did not agree with the explanation, then the onus was \non the department to prove that there was concealment of \nparticulars of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars of \nincome. In the instant case, such onus which shifted on the \ndepartment has not been discharged. In the circumstances, we do \nnot find that there is any ground for this Court to substitute our \ninterfere with the finding of the Tribunal on the aspect of the \nbonafides of the conduct of the assessee.” \n30. In the instant case, the assessee offered an explanation and we find \nthe explanation to be cogent because all deposits were made through \nbanking channels and out of two properties sold, the Assessing Officer \naccepted the assessee's stand that one of the properties was an \nagricultural land. Hence, we find that the burden cast upon the assessee \nto offer an explanation stands fulfilled. Consequently, the burden now \nshifts to the Revenue to establish the concealment of income or \nfurnishing of inaccurate particulars of income or both. If the Revenue \ndoes not agree with the explanation offered by the assessee as in the \ninstant case, then the onus is on the Revenue to prove that there was \nconcealment of particulars of income or furnishing of inaccurate \nparticulars of income. We find this aspect to be completely absent in the \ninstant case. Therefore, we also find the imposition of penalty to be \nunjustified. \n31. The assessee filed an appeal before the Tribunal, which confirmed the \norder passed by the CIT(A) that the assessee raised a new stand before \nthe CIT(A). No such new stand has been raised. The stand taken by the \nassessee after receipt of the notice under Section 143(2) of the Act dated \n02.9.2014 has been consistent i.e. before the Assessing Officer while \nsubmitting the reply to the penalty notice, in the appeal before the CIT(A) \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 26 :: \n \nand before the Tribunal. This is evident on a reading of the grounds of \nappeal filed before the CIT(A) as well as the notes of arguments filed by \nthe assessee before the CIT(A) dated 30.6.2017. Therefore, to that \nextent, the CIT(A) and the Tribunal have committed an error. \n32. The decision of this Court in the case of Sundaram Finance Ltd., was \ncouched on a different factual position wherein the Court rejected the \nplea of the assessee, which was a limited company, when they raised an \nargument with regard to the validity of the notice for the first time before \nthe High Court and considering the administrative set up of the said \nassessee and the fact that the assessee was never prejudiced on account \nof the alleged defect, the Court rejected the argument of the assessee. \n33. In the case on hand, we find that at the first instance, while replying \nto the penalty show cause notice dated 30.3.2016, the assessee raised a \nspecific plea that there was no concealment of income, that he had not \nfurnished inaccurate particulars of income and that the notice was not \nproper. Therefore, the phraseology, which was adopted by the assessee, \nif read as a whole, would clearly show that he had objected to the \nissuance of the notice and as there was no basis for issuance of the notice \nunder Section 271(1)(c) of the Act, both limbs in the said provision do not \nget attracted. Hence, the decision of this Court in the case of Sundaram \nFinance Ltd., cannot be applied. \n34. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of \nK.P.Madhusudhanan is factually different wherein the assessee was \nunable to furnish evidence for loans and that he offered the amount of \ntransaction as additional income and this explanation was not acceptable \nto the Assessing Officer and he applied Explanation (1B) to Section \n271(1)(c) of the Act and imposed penalty. \n35. In the instant case, the assessee has been able to explain the \ntransaction even at the first instance i.e. while submitting the reply dated \n15.3.2016 in response to the notice under Section 143(2) of the Act, \nwhich explanation he maintained till he filed an appeal before the \nTribunal. Therefore, on facts, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court \nin the case of K.P.Madhusudhanan is distinguishable. \n36. Further, the CIT(A) found fault with the assessee in not challenging \nthe assessment order and for having accepted the same. However, this \ncannot be a ground to enable the Assessing Officer to automatically levy \npenalty. In this regard, it is beneficial to refer to the decision of the \nHon'ble Division Bench of this Court in the case of CIT Vs. Smt.Anitha \nKumaran [reported in (2017) 79 Taxmann.com 304] wherein the decision \nof the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT Vs. Reliance Petro \nProducts (P) Limited [reported in (2010) 322 ITR 158] was followed \nwherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court examined the issue threadbare and \ndiscussed at length as to what was meant by the expression 'concealment \nof particulars of income and/or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of \nincome' and after applying the decision in the case of Reliance Petro \nProducts (P) Ltd., the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court dismissed the \nappeal filed by the Revenue in the following terms : \n“13.3. The Supreme Court examined the issue threadbare and \ndiscussed at length as to what was meant by the expression \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 27 :: \n \nconcealment of particulars of income and/or furnishing inaccurate \nparticulars of income and went on to observe as follows: \n\".....A glance at this provision would suggest that in order to be \ncovered, there has to be concealment of the particulars of the \nincome of the assessee. Secondly, the assessee must have \nfurnished inaccurate particulars of his income. Present is not the \ncase of concealment of the income. That is not the case of the \nRevenue either. However, the Learned Counsel for Revenue \nsuggested that by making incorrect claim for the expenditure on \ninterest, the assessee has furnished inaccurate particulars of the \nincome. As per Law Lexicon, the meaning of the word \"particular\" \nis a detail or details (in plural sense); the details of a claim, or the \nseparate items of an account. Therefore, the word \"particulars\" \nused in Section 271(1)(c) would embrace the meaning of the \ndetails of the claim made. It is an admitted position in the present \ncase that no information given in the Return was found to be \nincorrect or inaccurate. \nIt is not as if any statement made or any detail supplied was found \nto be factually incorrect. Hence, at least, prima facie, the assessee \ncannot be held guilty of furnishing inaccurate particulars. The \nLearned Counsel argued that \"submitting an incorrect claim in law \nfor the expenditure on interest would amount to giving inaccurate \nparticulars of such income\". \nWe do not think that such can be the interpretation of the \nconcerned words. The words are plain and simple. In order to \nexpose the assessee to the penalty unless the case is strictly \ncovered by the provision, the penalty provision cannot be invoked. \nBy any stretch of imagination, making an incorrect claim in law \ncannot tantamount to furnishing inaccurate particulars. In \nCommissioner of Income Tax, Delhi Vs. Atul Mohan Bindal \n[2009(9) SCC 589], where this Court was considering the same \nprovision, the Court observed that the Assessing Officer has to be \nsatisfied that a person has concealed the particulars of his income \nor furnished inaccurate particulars of such income....\" \n9. We are not concerned in the present case with the mens rea. \nHowever, we have to only see as to whether in this case, as a \nmatter of fact, the assessee has given inaccurate particulars. In \nWebster's Dictionary, the word \"inaccurate\" has been defined as:- \n\"not accurate, not exact or correct; not according to \ntruth; erroneous; as an inaccurate statement, copy or \ntranscript\". \nWe have already seen the meaning of the word \"particulars\" in the \nearlier part of this judgment. Reading the words in conjunction, \nthey must mean the details supplied in the Return, which are not \naccurate, not exact or correct, not according to truth or erroneous. \nWe must hasten to add here that in this case, there is no finding \nthat any details supplied by the assessee in its Return were found \nto be incorrect or erroneous or false. Such not being the case, \nthere would be no question of inviting the penalty under Section \n271(1)(c) of the Act. A mere making of the claim, which is not \nsustainable in law, by itself, will not amount to furnishing \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 28 :: \n \ninaccurate particulars regarding the income of the assessee. Such \nclaim made in the Return cannot amount to the inaccurate \nparticulars. \n10. It was tried to be suggested that Section 14A of the Act \nspecifically excluded the deductions in respect of the expenditure \nincurred by the assessee in relation to income which does not form \npart of the total income under the Act. It was further pointed out \nthat the dividends from the shares did not form the part of the \ntotal income. It was, therefore, reiterated before us that the \nAssessing Officer had correctly reached the conclusion that since \nthe assessee had claimed excessive deductions knowing that they \nare incorrect; it amounted to concealment of income. It was tried \nto be argued that the falsehood in accounts can take either of the \ntwo forms; (i) an item of receipt may be suppressed fraudulently; \n(ii) an item of expenditure may be falsely (or in an exaggerated \namount) claimed, and both types attempt to reduce the taxable \nincome and, therefore, both types amount to concealment of \nparticulars of one's income as well as furnishing of inaccurate \nparticulars of income. \nWe do not agree, as the assessee had furnished all the details of \nits expenditure as well as income in its Return, which details, in \nthemselves, were not found to be inaccurate nor could be viewed \nas the concealment of income on its part. It was up to the \nauthorities to accept its claim in the Return or not. Merely because \nthe assessee had claimed the expenditure, which claim was not \naccepted or was not acceptable to the Revenue, that by itself \nwould not, in our opinion, attract the penalty under Section \n271(1)(c). If we accept the contention of the Revenue then in case \nof every Return where the claim made is not accepted by \nAssessing Officer for any reason, the assessee will invite penalty \nunder Section 271(1)(c). That is clearly not the intendment of the \nLegislature.\" \n37. On this issue, a useful reference can be to the decision of the Gujarat \nHigh Court in the case of National Textiles Vs. CIT [reported in (2001) \n249 ITR 125], which related to the assessment year 1974-75 wherein it \nwas held that in order to justify the levy of penalty, two factors must co-\nexist namely (i) there must be some material or circumstance leading to \na reasonable conclusion that the amount does not represent the \nassessee's income and it is not enough for the purpose of penalty that the \namount has been assessed as income and (ii) the circumstances must \nshow that there was animus i.e. conscious concealment or act of \nfurnishing inaccurate particulars on the part of the assessee. \n38. Further, the decision of the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in the \ncase of CIT Vs. S.I.Paripushpam [reported in (2001) 118 Taxman 844] \nwould support the case of the assessee. In the said case, the Appellate \nAssistant Commissioner, in the penalty proceedings, held that the \namount, the addition of which was agreed to by the assessee was an \namount, which had been set out in an enclosure filed along with the \nreturn. While testing the correctness of the order, the Tribunal held that \nthe levy of penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act was wholly \nunwarranted as there had been no fraud or wilful neglect and that the \nassessee had only, with a view to cooperate with the Department, agreed \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 29 :: \n \nto the addition. We observe that the above position will help the \nassessee, as there is not even a remote allegation that there was any \nfraudulent act by the assessee or the assessee was guilty of wilfully or \nnegligently concealing the income and that his agreement to the addition \nof the amount, by itself, will not establish fraud or wilful neglect without \nsomething more. \n39. For the above reasons, the assessee has to succeed on all grounds \nand consequently, it has to be held that the notice initiating the penalty \nproceedings is defective and invalid and the other findings rendered by \nthe Assessing Officer, the CIT(A) and the Tribunal do not warrant \nimposition of penalty on the assessee. \n40. In the result, the above tax case appeal is allowed, the impugned \norder passed by the Tribunal is set aside and the substantial questions of \nlaw are answered in favour of the assessee. No costs. \n16. \nThe assessee is also relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble \nKarnataka High Court in the case of CIT v. Manjunatha Cotton & Ginning \nFactory (supra), wherein, the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court has \nconsidered an identical issue in light of show cause notice issued u/s.274 \nr.w.s.271(1)(c) of the Act and after considering relevant facts held that \nnotice u/s.274 of the Act should specifically refer the grounds mentioned \nu/s.271(1)(c) of the Act i.e. whether it is for ‘concealment of particulars \nof income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income’. Sending \nprinted form of notice where all the grounds mentioned in u/s.271(1)(c) \nof the Act, would not specify the requirement of law. The relevant \nfindings of the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court are as under: \n• Penalty under section 271(l)(c) is a civil liability. Therefore, mens re a \nis not an essential element for imposing penalty for breach of such civil \nobligations or liabilities. Willful concealment is not an essential ingredient \nfor attracting civil liability. [Para 63] \n• Existence of conditions stipulated in section 271(l)(c) is a sine qua non \nfor initiation of penalty proceedings under section 271. The existence of \nsuch conditions should be discernible from the assessment order or order \nof the Appellate Authority or Revisional Authority. Even if there is no \nspecific finding regarding the existence of the conditions mentioned in \nsection 271(1)(c), at least the facts set out in Explanation I (A) and (B) \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 30 :: \n \nshould be discernible from the said order, which would, by a legal fiction, \nconstitute concealment because of deeming provision. Even if these \nconditions cio not exist in the assessment order passed, at least, a \ndirection to initiate proceedings under section 271(l)(c) is a sine qua non \nfor the Assessing Officer to initiate the proceedings because of the \ndeeming provision contained in section 1(B). The said deeming provisions \nare not applicable to the orders passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) \nand the Commissioner. [Para 63] \n• The imposition of penalty is not automatic, i.e., imposition of penalty \neven if the tax liability is admitted, is not automatic. Even if the assessee \nhas not challenged the order of assessment levying tax and interest and \nhas paid the same, that by itself would not be sufficient for the authorities \neither to initiate penalty proceedings or impose penalty, unless it is \ndiscernible from the assessment order that, it is on account of such \nunearthing or enquiry concluded by authorities which has resulted in \npayment of such tax or such tax liability came to be admitted, and if not, \nit would have escaped from tax net as opined by the Assessing Officer in \nthe assessment order. Only when no explanation is offered or the \nexplanation offered is found to be false or when the assessee fails to \nprove that the explanation offered is not bona fide, an order imposing \npenalty can be passed. If the explanation offered, even though not \nsubstantiated by the assessee, is found to be bona fide and all facts \nrelating to the same and material for the compulation of his total income \nhave been disclosed by him, no penalty can be imposed. [Para 63] \n• The direction referred to in Explanation IB to section 271 should be \nclear and without any ambiguity. If the Assessing Officer has not recorded \nany satisfaction or has not issued any direction to initiate penalty \nproceedings in appeal, but the appellate authority records satisfaction, \nthen the penalty proceedings have to be initiated by the appellate \nauthority and not the Assessing Authority. \n• Notice under section 274 should specifically state the grounds \nmentioned in section 271(T)(c), i.e., whether it is for concealment of \nincome or for furnishing of incorrect particulars of income. Sending \nprinted form, where all the grounds mentioned in section 271 are \nmentioned, would not satisfy requirement of law. The assessee should \nknow the grounds which he has to meet specifically. Otherwise, principles \nof natural justice is offended. On the basis of such proceedings, no \npenalty could be imposed to the assessee. Taking up of penalty \nproceedings on one limb and finding the assessee guilty of another limb is \nbad in law. [Para 63] \n• The penalty proceedings are distinct from the assessment \nproceedings. The proceedings for imposition of penalty, though emanate \nfrom proceedings of assessment, are independent and separate aspect of \nthe proceedings. The findings recorded in the assessment proceedings in \nso far as 'concealment of income1 and 'furnishing of incorrect particulars' \nwould not operate as res judicata in the penalty proceedings. It is open to \nthe assessee to contest the said proceedings on merits. However, the \nvalidity of the assessment or reassessment in pursuance of which penalty \nis levied, cannot be the subject matter of penalty proceedings. The \nassessment or reassessment cannot be declared as invalid in the penalty \nproceedings. [Para 63] \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 31 :: \n \nTherefore, it is clear that merely because the assessee agreed for addition \nand accordingly assessment order was passed on the basis of this \naddition and when the assessee had paid the tax and the interest thereon \nin the absence of any material on record to show the concealment of \nincome, it cannot be inferred that the said addition was on account of \nconcealment. Moreover, the assessee had offered the explanation. The \nsaid explanation was not found to be false. On the contrary, it was held to \nbe bona fide. In fact, in the assessment proceedings, there is no whisper \nabout these concealment. Under these circumstances, the entry found in \nthe rough cash book could have been reflected in the accounts for the \nsaid financial year in which the survey took place, as the last date for \nclosing the account was still not over. The very fact that the assessee \nagreed to pay tax and did not challenge the assessment order, cannot be \nconstrued as mala fide. Therefore, the Tribunal was justified in setting \naside the orders passed by the Appellate Authority as well as the \nAssessing Authority. [Para 64] \nCase 2 \nThe Tribunal was justified in holding that the entire proceedings were \nvitiated as the notice issued was not in accordance with law and \naccordingly justified in interfering with the order passed by the Appellate \nAuthority as well as the Assessing Authority and in setting aside the \nsame. Hence, the substantial questions of law framed in this case is \nanswered in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. [Para 66] \nCase 3 \n• In the instant case, the penalty proceedings were initiated by the \nAssessing Authority initially on the basis of his assessment order. During \nthe pendency of the said penalty proceedings, the assessment order was \nchallenged by way of an appeal. In appeal the Appellate Authority deleted \nthe additions made under section 69 by the Assessing Authority. Instead, \nhe sustained additions under new grounds of under valuation of the \nclosing stock. However, the Assessing Authority, in the penalty \nproceedings, took note of the Appellate order and suitably amended the \npenalty proceedings and proceeded further in the matter and then \nimposed penalty. Therefore, it is clear, that the subject matter of the \npenalty proceedings was the order of the Appellate Authority and not the \norder passed by the Assessing Authority. If the Appellate Authority was \nsatisfied that the addition had to be made on the ground of under \nvaluation of the closing stock, which was not the finding recorded by the \nAssessing Authority, on which penalty proceedings had been initiated by \nthe Assessing Authority, then, it was the Appellate Authority who should \nhave initiated penalty proceedings and issued notice to the assessee to \nshow cause why penalty should not be imposed. The said procedure was \nnot followed, and therefore, though for different reasons, the first \nAppellate Authority set aside the order levying penalty, the Tribunal \ncorrectly appreciated the facts in a proper perspective and was justified in \nnot interfering with the order passed by the Appellate Authority, setting \naside the penalty order. In that view of the matter, there is no \njustification to interfere with the well considered order passed by the \nTribunal. Thus, the substantial questions of law are answered in favour of \nthe assessee and against the revenue. [Para 67] \n \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 32 :: \n \nCase 4 \n When two fact finding authorities were satisfied that the explanation \noffered by the assessee was not false and it was a bona fide one, though \nthe assessee had failed to conclusively prove the explanation offered, \nthere is no justification to interfere with the well considered order passed \nby the Tribunal. Accordingly, the substantial question of law is answered \nin favour of the assessee and against the revenue. [Para 68] \n \n17. \nThe assessee is also relied upon the order of the ITAT Chennai in \nthe case of Shri Mahaveerchand Jain in ITA No.912/Chny/2020 order \ndated 13.05.2022. The Tribunal under identical set of facts held as under: \n6. Upon careful consideration of factual matrix, it could be gathered that \nthe assessee made large cash deposits in his bank account and attributed \nthe same to the fact that cash was received out of auctions as well as \nfrom private parties against equivalent amount of cheque. However, in \nthe absence of any satisfactory explanation / evidences forthcoming from \nthe assessee, the same has been added u/s 68 in the hands of the \nassessee. The additions have been confirmed up-to the level of Tribunal. \n7. Before us, Ld. AR raised a pertinent legal issue and submitted that \nspecific charge i.e., furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income or \nconcealment of income, has not been framed against the assessee in the \nshow-cause notice as well as in penalty order. Therefore, considering the \nratio of various binding judicial precedents, the penalty stood vitiated for \nwant of framing of specific charge. The copies of these decisions have \nbeen placed on record which include the decision of Hon’ble Madras High \nCourt in Babuji Jacob vs ITO (430 ITR 259) as well as the decision of \nHon’ble Bombay High Court in PCIT V/s Goa Coastal Resorts and \nRecreation (P.) Ltd (272 Taxman 157) against which revenue’s Special \nLeave petition (SLP) has already been dismissed by Hon’ble Supreme \nCourt which is reported at 130 Taxmann.com 379. The Ld. Sr. DR, has \nsimilarly relied on decision of High Court of Madras in M/s. Gangotri \nTextiles Ltd vs DCIT (121 Taxmann.com 171) as well as another decision \nin Sundaram Finance Ltd. Vs ACIT (93 Taxmann.com 250) against which \nthe assessee’s SLP has already been dismissed by Hon’ble Supreme Court \nwhich is reported at 99 Taxmann.com 152. \n8. Upon perusal of notice issued u/s 274 r.w.s. 271(1)(c) as extracted \nabove, we find that though the applicable clause has been ticked by Ld. \nAO, however, the applicable limb i.e., whether the penalty was being \ninitiated for furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income or for \nconcealment of income has not been specified. Even in the body of \npenalty order, penalty has mechanically been levied without framing \nspecific charge against the assessee. As per settled legal position, the \nfailure to frame specific charge against the assessee would vitiate the \npenalty proceedings and the penalty would be bad in law. The two limbs \nof Sec.271(1)(c) are concealment of income and furnishing of inaccurate \nparticulars of income which carry different connotation / meaning. \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 33 :: \n \nNonframing of specific charge against the assessee would vitiate the \npenalty proceedings since the penalty could be levied only for a specific \ncharge. Furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income means, when the \nassessee has not disclosed the particulars correctly or the particulars \ndisclosed by the assessee are found to be incorrect whereas, concealment \nof particulars of income would mean that the assessee has concealed the \nincome and has not reflected certain income in its return of income. It \ncould be seen that the show-cause notice issued u/s 274 r.w.s 271 was a \nvague notice in a printed form without specifying the exact charge for \nwhich the assessee was being penalized and therefore, it was a clear case \nof non-application of mind while initiating penalty against the assessee. \nThe Ld. AO, while initiating the penalty was not clear as to specific limb \nwhich was applicable to given factual matrix. This is further fortified by \nthe fact that no such exact charge has not been framed in the penalty \norder. \n9. At this juncture, it would be useful to take note of the decision of \nHon’ble High Court of Madras in the case of Babuji Jacob Vs. lTO (430 lTR \n259; 08.12.2020). Upon perusal of the same, we find that the ratio of this \ndecision is squarely applicable to the legal grounds raised by the \nassessee. The Hon’ble Court, inter-alia, held that the impugned notice \nunder section 271(1)(c) did not specifically state as to whether assessee \nwas guilty of concealing particulars of his income or had furnished \ninaccurate particulars of income. Hence, the impugned penalty was \ninvalid and same was to be set aside. The adjudication of Hon’ble Court \nwas as under: - \n18. The first aspect is as to whether there is any concealment of \nparticulars of the assessee's income. At the first instance i.e. during the \nscrutiny assessment, the assessee sent a letter dated 15.3.2016 \nexplaining the entire transaction wherein he had stated that while filing \nthe return of income, he was under the impression that both the \nproperties were agricultural lands and that there was no tax liability. \nConsequently, since one of the properties namely the property at Egattur \nVillage was treated to be a capital asset, the long term capital gains were \ncomputed and the assessee requested for deduction under Section 54F of \nthe Act, as the sale consideration received was utilized for purchase of a \nnew flat, in which, the name of the assessee's wife was also included as a \npurchaser. The assessee further stated about the sale of livestock and \nstanding crops. The assessee also stated that he is a senior citizen \ncarrying on agricultural operations for 27 years and that his income was \nbased upon the interest received from bank deposits and offered that a \nsum of Rs.50 lakhs may be treated as revenue in nature and taxed as \nincome though there was no positive fact or finding had been found so as \nto avoid protracted litigation. \n19. Further, with regard to deposits, the assessee explained that he had \nreceived the amount of Rs.21,56,250/- towards development cost of the \nagricultural land and a copy of the letter acknowledging payment made \nby the party was produced. This amount was received by RTGS to his \nbank account and the buyer had confirmed in writing that this was paid as \ndevelopment cost. Hence, this amount related to sale consideration of the \nland. \n20. This explanation, which was offered by the assessee, did not find \nfavour with the Assessing Officer, who rejected the same and completed \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 34 :: \n \nthe assessment vide order dated 30.3.2016 under Section143(3) of the \nAct and made additions as mentioned above. Thus, there was no \nallegation in the assessment under Section 143(3) of the Act that there \nhad been concealment of particulars of income. \n21. Admittedly, all the amounts were received by the assessee through \nbanking channels and he had mentioned about the same in his return of \nincome. The only mistake done by the assessee was to treat both the \nlands as agricultural lands. Once the notice under Section 143(3) of the \nAct was issued, the assessee was able to convince the Assessing Officer \nthat the lands in Pudhupakkam Village were to be treated as agricultural \nlands. But, he was unable to convince the Assessing Officer that the lands \nin Egattur Village were agricultural lands, which were treated to be a \ncapital asset. Therefore, there wasno material available with the \nAssessing Officer to allege concealment of particulars of income. \n22. With regard to furnishing of inaccurate particulars, the stand taken by \nthe assessee was that both lands were agricultural lands, that he had \nbeen carrying on agricultural operations for 27 years, that he had been \nfiling return of income regularly and that the source of income was from \nagricultural income and interest income from bank deposits. These facts \nwere never disputed by the Assessing Officer. \n23. After receipt of the penalty notice, the assessee submitted a reply \ndated 11.4.2016 wherein the assessee reiterated the stand taken in his \nletter dated 15.3.2016. However, the same was not accepted by the \nAssessing Officer while completing the assessment under Section 143(3) \nof the Act. The assessee further stated that he had produced all the facts \nof the transactions namely sale documents, materials, etc., before the \nAssessing Officer and therefore, it cannot be construed as furnishing of \ninaccurate particulars. The assessee also pointed out that while allowing \nexemption under Section 54F of the Act, the Assessing Officer considered \n50% of the investments whereas 100% investments were done through \nbanking channels. Therefore, the assessee stated that it cannot be said \nthat correct particulars of income were not furnished. The assessee \nfurther pointed out that he was in need of funds for purchase of a new \nflat, that he sold trees with roots, coconut seedling and other \nmiscellaneous items, that the farming sector was an unorganized sector, \nthat all were sold to agriculturists and that he cannot be compelled to \nfurnish details in this regard. The assessee furthermore pointed out that \nfull particulars such as bank statements, cash deposit out of accumulated \nincome were fully disclosed and furnished to the Assessing Officer, that \nthere was no non disclosure, that the explanation offered was bona fide \nand that therefore, penalty could not be imposed. \n24. The Assessing Officer, while imposing penalty vide order dated \n28.9.2016, held that but for the scrutiny assessment under Section \n143(3) of the Act, the cash deposits would not have come to light and \ntherefore, rendered a finding that the assessee furnished inaccurate \nparticulars. \n25. This finding of the Assessing Officer is incorrect because while \ncompleting the assessment under Section 143(3) of the Act, there was no \nallegation against the assessee as to furnishing of inaccurate particulars. \nBut, the Assessing Officer did not accept the explanation offered by the \nassessee and made certain additions, which will not automatically result \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 35 :: \n \nin interpreting the same as furnishing of inaccurate particulars. Further, \nwe find that there is no specific finding as regards the concealment \nagainst the assessee because, on facts, it has been established before the \nAssessing Officer while completing the assessment under Section 143(3) \nof the Act that all transactions were through banking channels. Hence, \nthe argument of Mrs.R.Hemalatha, learned Senior Standing Counsel \nappearing for the Revenue that both limbs of Section 271(1)(c) of the Act \nare attracted has to necessarily fall. Hence, we hold that there is inherent \ndefect in the notice dated 30.3.2016 issued under Section 271(1)(c) of \nthe Act, as it will vitiate the entire proceedings. \n26. Since we have heard the learned counsel on the correctness of the \norders passed by the Assessing Officer, the CIT(A) and the Tribunal on \nthe merits of the matter, we proceed to discuss the otherissues as well. \n27. The CIT(A), while confirming the order of penalty, took note of the \norder passed by the Assessing Officer wherein the Assessing Officer \nrejected the explanation offered by the assessee, which ultimately \nresulted in an addition and the assessment was completed vide order \ndated 30.3.2016. The question would be as to whether rejection of the \nexplanation and the consequential addition would automatically result in \nan order of penalty. \n28. Mrs.R.Hemalatha, learned Senior Standing Counsel appearing for the \nRevenue seeks to substantiate her case by relying upon the decision of \nthe Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mak Data (P) Ltd. Vs. CIT, II \n[reported in (2013) 38 Taxmann.com 448] wherein it was held that \nvoluntary disclosure does not release the assessee from mischief of \npenalty proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act and in terms of \nthe said provision, the Assessing Officer has to satisfy as to whether the \npenalty proceedings have to be initiated or not during the course of \nassessment proceedings and he is not required to record his satisfaction \nin a particular manner or reduceit into writing. \n29. Reliance is also placed on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court \nin the case of K.P.Madhusudhanan Vs. CIT [reported in (2001) 118 \nTaxman 324]. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of \nMak Data (P) Ltd., was taken note of by the Division Bench of this Court, \nto which, one of us (TSSJ) was a party, in the case of CIT, Chennai-IV Vs. \nGem Granites (Karnataka) [reported in (2014) 42 Taxmann.com 493] and \nthe aspect as to how onus/burden of proof shifts from the assessee to the \nRevenue when penalty proceedings are initiated, is held in thefollowing \nterms : \n“11. In a recent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal \nNo.9772 of 2013, dated 30.10.2013 (Mak Data P. Ltd., vs. Commissioner \nof Income Tax-II), the Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering \ntheExplanation to Section 271(1), held that the question would be \nwhether the assessee had offered an explanation for concealment of \nparticulars of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income and \nthe Explanation to Section 271(1) raises a presumption of concealment, \nwhen a difference is noticed by the Assessing Officer between the \nreported and assessed income. The burden is then on the assessee to \nshow otherwise, by cogent and reliable evidence and when the initial onus \nplaced by the explanation, has been discharged by the assessee, the onus \nshifts on the Revenue to show that the amount in question constituted \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 36 :: \n \ntheir income and not otherwise. Factually, we find that the onus cast \nupon the assessee has been discharged by giving a cogent and reliable \nexplanation. Therefore, if the department did not agree with the \nexplanation, then the onus was on the department to prove that there \nwas concealment of particulars of income or furnishing inaccurate \nparticulars of income. In the instant case, such onus which shifted on the \ndepartment has not been discharged. In the circumstances, we do not \nfind that there is any ground for this Court to substitute our interfere with \nthe finding of the Tribunal on the aspect of the bonafides of the conduct \nof the assessee.” \n30. In the instant case, the assessee offered an explanation and we find \nthe explanation to be cogent because all deposits were made through \nbanking channels and out of two properties sold, the Assessing Officer \naccepted the assessee's stand that one of the properties was an \nagricultural land. Hence, we find that the burden cast upon the assessee \nto offer an explanation stands fulfilled. Consequently, the burden now \nshifts to the Revenue to establish the concealment of income or \nfurnishing of inaccurate particulars of income or both. If the Revenue \ndoes not agree with the explanation offered by the assessee as in the \ninstant case, then the onus is on the Revenue to prove that there was \nconcealment of particulars of income or furnishing of inaccurate \nparticulars of income. We find this aspect to be completely absent in the \ninstant case. Therefore, we also find the imposition of penalty to be \nunjustified. \n31. The assessee filed an appeal before the Tribunal, which confirmed the \norder passed by the CIT(A) that the assessee raised a new stand before \nthe CIT(A). No such new stand has been raised. The stand taken by the \nassessee after receipt of the notice under Section 143(2) of the Act dated \n02.9.2014 has been consistent i.e. before the Assessing Officer while \nsubmitting the reply to the penalty notice, in the appeal before the CIT(A) \nand before the Tribunal. This is evident on a reading of the grounds of \nappeal filed before the CIT(A) as well as the notes of arguments filed by \nthe assessee before the CIT(A) dated 30.6.2017. Therefore, to that \nextent, the CIT(A) and the Tribunal have committed an error. \n32. The decision of this Court in the case of Sundaram Finance Ltd., was \ncouched on a different factual position wherein the Court rejected the \nplea of the assessee, which was a limited company, when they raised an \nargument with regard to the validity of the notice for the first time before \nthe High Court and considering the administrative set up of the said \nassessee and the fact that the assessee was never prejudiced on account \nof the alleged defect, the Court rejected the argument of the assessee. \n33. In the case on hand, we find that at the first instance, while replying \nto the penalty show cause notice dated 30.3.2016, the assessee raised a \nspecific plea that there was no concealment of income, that he had not \nfurnished inaccurate particulars of income and that the notice was not \nproper. Therefore, the phraseology, which was adopted by the assessee, \nif read as a whole, would clearly show that he had objected to the \nissuance of the notice and as there was no basis for issuance of the notice \nunder Section 271(1)(c) of the Act, both limbs in the said provision do not \nget attracted. Hence, the decision of this Court in the case of Sundaram \nFinance Ltd., cannot be applied. \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 37 :: \n \n34. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of \nK.P.Madhusudhanan is factually different wherein the assessee was \nunable to furnish evidence for loans and that he offered the amount of \ntransaction as additional income and this explanation was not acceptable \nto the Assessing Officer and he applied Explanation (1B) to Section \n271(1)(c) of the Act and imposed penalty. \n35. In the instant case, the assessee has been able to explain the \ntransaction even at the first instance i.e. while submitting the reply dated \n15.3.2016 in response to the notice under Section 143(2) of the Act, \nwhich explanation he maintained till he filed an appeal before the \nTribunal. Therefore, on facts, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court \nin the case of K.P.Madhusudhanan is distinguishable. \n36. Further, the CIT(A) found fault with the assessee in not challenging \nthe assessment order and for having accepted the same. However, this \ncannot be a ground to enable the Assessing Officer to automatically levy \npenalty. In this regard, it is beneficial to refer to the decision of the \nHon'ble Division Bench of this Court in the case of CIT Vs. Smt.Anitha \nKumaran [reported in (2017) 79 Taxmann.com304] wherein the decision \nof the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT Vs. Reliance Petro \nProducts (P) Limited [reported in (2010) 322 ITR 158] was followed \nwherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court examined the issue threadbare and \ndiscussed at length as to what was meant by the expression 'concealment \nof particulars of income and/or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of \nincome' and after applying the decision in the case of Reliance Petro \nProducts (P) Ltd., the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court dismissed the \nappeal filed by the Revenue in the following terms : \n“13.3. The Supreme Court examined the issue threadbare and discussed \nat length as to what was meant by the expression concealment of \nparticulars of income and/or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income \nand went on to observe as follows: \n\".....A glance at this provision would suggest that in order to be covered, \nthere has to be concealment of the particulars of the income of the \nassessee. Secondly, the assessee must have furnished inaccurate \nparticulars of his income. Present is not the case of concealment of the \nincome. That is not the case of the Revenue either. However, the Learned \nCounsel for Revenue suggested that by making incorrect claim for the \nexpenditure on interest, the assessee has furnished inaccurate particulars \nof the income. As per Law Lexicon, the meaning of the word \"particular\" \nis a detail or details (in plural sense); the details of a claim, or the \nseparate items of an account. Therefore, the word \"particulars\" used in \nSection 271(1)(c) would embrace the meaning of the details of the claim \nmade. It is an admitted position in the present case that no information \ngiven in the Return was found to be incorrect or inaccurate. It is not as if \nany statement made or any detail supplied was found to be factually \nincorrect. Hence, at least, prima facie, the assessee cannot be held guilty \nof furnishing inaccurate particulars. The Learned Counsel argued that \n\"submitting an incorrect claim in law for the expenditure on interest \nwould amount to giving inaccurate particulars of such income\". We do not \nthink that such can be the interpretation of the concerned words. The \nwords are plain and simple. In order to expose the assessee to the \npenalty unless the case is strictly covered by the provision, the penalty \nprovision cannot be invoked. By any stretch of imagination, making an \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 38 :: \n \nincorrect claim in law cannot tantamount to furnishing inaccurate \nparticulars. In Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi Vs. Atul Mohan Bindal \n[2009(9) SCC 589], where this Court was considering the same provision, \nthe Court observed that the Assessing Officer has to be satisfied that a \nperson has concealed the particulars of his income or furnished inaccurate \nparticulars of such income....\" \n9. We are not concerned in the present case with the mens rea. However, \nwe have to only see as to whether in this case, as a matter of fact, the \nassessee has given inaccurate particulars. In Webster's Dictionary, the \nword \"inaccurate\" has been defined as:- \"not accurate, not exact or \ncorrect; not according to truth; erroneous; as an inaccurate statement, \ncopy or transcript\". We have already seen the meaning of the word \n\"particulars\" in the earlier part of this judgment. Reading the words in \nconjunction, they must mean the details supplied in the Return, which are \nnot accurate, not exact or correct, not according to truth or erroneous. \nWe must hasten to add here that in this case,there is no finding that any \ndetails supplied by the assessee in its Return were found to be incorrect \nor erroneous or false. Such not being the case, there would be no \nquestion of inviting the penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act. A \nmere making of the claim, which is not sustainable in law, by itself, will \nnotamount to furnishing inaccurate particulars regarding the income of \nthe assessee. Such claim made in the Return cannot amount to the \ninaccurate particulars. \n10. It was tried to be suggested that Section 14A of the Act specifically \nexcluded the deductions in respect of the expenditure incurred by the \nassessee in relation to income which does not form part of the total \nincome under the Act. It was further pointed out that the dividends from \nthe shares did not form the part of the total income. It was, therefore, \nreiterated before us that the Assessing Officer had correctly reached the \nconclusion that since the assessee had claimed excessive deductions \nknowing that they areincorrect; it amounted to concealment of income. It \nwas tried to be argued that the falsehood in accounts can take either of \nthe two forms; (i) an item of receipt may be suppressed fraudulently; (ii) \nan item of expenditure may be falsely (or in an exaggerated amount) \nclaimed, and both types attempt to reduce the taxable income and, \ntherefore, both types amount to concealment of particulars of one's \nincome as well as furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income. We do \nnot agree, as the assessee had furnished all the details of its expenditure \nas well as income in its Return, which details, in themselves, were not \nfound to be inaccurate nor could be viewed as the concealment of income \non its part. It was up to the authorities to accept its claim in the Return or \nnot. Merely because the assessee had claimed the expenditure, which \nclaim was not accepted or was not acceptable to the Revenue, that by \nitself would not, in our opinion, attract the penalty under Section \n271(1)(c). If we accept the contention of the Revenue then in case of \nevery Return where the claim made is not accepted by Assessing Officer \nfor any reason,the assessee will invite penalty under Section 271(1)(c). \nThat is clearly not the intendment of the Legislature.\" \n37. On this issue, a useful reference can be to the decision of the Gujarat \nHigh Court in the case of National Textiles Vs. CIT [reported in (2001) \n249 ITR 125], which related to the assessment year 1974-75 wherein it \nwas held that in order to justify the levy of penalty, two factors must co-\nexist namely (i) there must be some material or circumstance leading to \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 39 :: \n \na reasonable conclusion that the amount does not represent the \nassessee's income and it is not enough for the purpose of penalty that the \namount has been assessed as income and (ii) the circumstances must \nshow that there was animus i.e. conscious concealment or act of \nfurnishing inaccurate particulars on the part of the assessee. \n38. Further, the decision of the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in the \ncase of CIT Vs. S.I.Paripushpam [reported in (2001) 118 Taxman 844] \nwould support the case of the assessee. In the said case, the Appellate \nAssistant Commissioner, in the penalty proceedings, held that the \namount, the addition of which was agreed to by the assessee was an \namount, which had been set out in an enclosure filed along with the \nreturn. While testing the correctness of the order, the Tribunal held that \nthe levy of penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act was wholly \nunwarranted as there had been no fraud or wilful neglect and that the \nassessee had only, with a view to cooperate with the Department, agreed \nto the addition. We observe that the above position will help the \nassessee, as there is not even a remote allegation that there was any \nfraudulent act by the assessee or the assessee was guilty of wilfully or \nnegligently concealing the income and that his agreement to the addition \nof the amount, by itself, will not establish fraud or wilful neglect without \nsomething more. \n39. For the above reasons, the assessee has to succeed on all grounds \nand consequently, it has to be held that the notice initiating the penalty \nproceedings is defective and invalid and the other findings rendered by \nthe Assessing Officer, the CIT(A) and the Tribunal do not warrant \nimposition of penalty on the assessee. 40. In the result, the above tax \ncase appeal is allowed, the impugned order passed by the Tribunal is set \naside and the substantial questions of law are answered in favour of the \nassessee. No costs. \n10. Similar is the decision of Hon’ble Bombay High Court in PCIT V/s Goa \nCoastal Resorts and Recreation (P.) Ltd (272 Taxman 157) which has not \nadmitted question of law raised by the revenue by observing as under: - \n5. We have carefully examined the record as well as duly considered the \nrival contentions. Both the Commissioner (Appeals) as well as the ITAT \nhave categorically held that in the present case, there is no record of \nsatisfaction by the Assessing Officer that there was any concealment of \nincome or that any inaccurate particulars were furnished by the assessee. \nThis being a sine qua non for initiation of penalty proceedings, in the \nabsence of such petition, the two authorities have quite correctly ordered \nthe dropping of penalty proceedings against the petitioner. \n6. Besides, we note that the Division Bench of this Court in Samson \nPreinchery (supra) as well as in New Era Sova Mine (supra) has held that \nthe notice which is issued to the assessee must indicate whether the \nAssessing Officer is satisfied that the case of the assessee involves \nconcealment of particulars of income or furnishing of inaccurate \nparticulars of income or both, with clarity. If the notice is issued in the \nprinted form, then, the necessary portions which are not applicable are \nrequired to be struck off, so as to indicate with clarity the nature of the \nsatisfaction recorded. In both Samson Perinchery and New Era Sova Mine \n(supra), the notices issued had not struck of the portion which were \ninapplicable. From this, the Division Bench concluded that there was no \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 40 :: \n \nproper record of satisfaction or proper application of mind in matter of \ninitiation of penalty proceedings. \n7. In the present case, as well if the notice dated 30/09/16 (at page 33) \nis perused, it is apparent that the relevant portions have not been struck \noff. This coupled with the fact adverted to in paragraph (5) of this order, \nleaves no ground for interference with the impugned order. The impugned \norder are quite consistent by the law laid down in the case of Samson \nPerinchery and New Era Sova Mine(supra) and therefore, warrant no \ninterference. \n8. The contention based upon MAK Data (P.) Ltd.(supra) also does not \nappeal to us in the peculiar facts of the present case. The notice in the \npresent case is itself is defective and further, there is no finding or \nsatisfaction recorded in relation to concealment or furnishing of \ninaccurate particulars. \n9. For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that no substantial questions of law \narises in this appeal. Consequently, this appeal is dismissed. \nThe revenue’s SLP against this decision has already been dismissed by \nHon’ble Supreme Court on 31.08.2021 (130 Taxmann.com 379) by \nobserving as under: - \n \n1. Delay condoned. \n2. We are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order. \n3. The special leave petition is, accordingly, dismissed. \n4. Pending application stands disposed of. \n \n11. Similar is the decision of Hon’ble Bombay High Court rendered in CIT \nVs. Samson Perinchery [2017 88 taxmann.com 413] wherein Hon’ble \nCourt has confirmed the ratio laid down by Hon’ble Karnataka High Court \nin CIT V/s Manjunatha Cotton & Ginning Factory (359 ITR 565). This \ndecision of Hon’ble Karnataka High Court has subsequently been followed \nby the same court in the case of CIT V/s SSA’s Emerald Meadows (2016 \n73 Taxmann.com 241) which was agitated by the revenue before Hon’ble \nSupreme Court. However, Special Leave Petition, against the same, was \ndismissed by the Hon’ble Court on 05/08/2016 which is reported at 73 \nTaxmann.com 248. This decision of Hon’ble Karnataka High Court \nrendered in Manjunatha Cotton & Ginning Factory has subsequently been \nfollowed extensively in catena of judicial pronouncements rendered by \nvarious Hon’ble High Courts as well as different benches of Tribunal and \ntaken a view that non-framing of specific charge in the show-cause notice \nwould vitiate the penalty proceedings. The failure to frame specific charge \nagainst the assessee during penalty proceedings would be fatal to penalty \nproceedings itself and the same could not be sustained in the eyes of law. \n12. Recently, the issue of defect in notice has been dealt at length by \nlarger bench of Hon'ble Bombay High Court in Mohd. Farhan A.Shaikh V/s \nDCIT (125 taxmann.com 253) wherein the Hon'ble Court has answered \nthe issue of reference as follows: - \nAnswers: \nQuestion No. 1: If the assessment order clearly records satisfaction for \nimposing penalty on one or the other, or both grounds mentioned in \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 41 :: \n \nSection 271(1)(c), does a mere defect in the notice—not striking off the \nirrelevant matter—vitiate the penalty proceedings? \n181. It does. The primary burden lies on the Revenue. In the assessment \nproceedings, it forms an opinion, prima facie or otherwise, to launch \npenalty proceedings against the assessee. But that translates into action \nonly through the statutory notice under section 271(1)(c), read with \nsection 274 of IT Act. True, the assessment proceedings form the basis \nfor the penalty proceedings, but they are not composite proceedings to \ndraw strength from each other. Nor can each cure the other's defect. A \npenalty proceeding is a corollary; nevertheless, it must stand on its own. \nThese proceedings culminate under a different statutory scheme that \nremains distinct from the assessment proceedings, Therefore, the \nassessee must be informed of the grounds of the penalty proceedings \nonly through statutory notice. An omnibus notice suffers from the vice of \nvagueness. \n182. More particularly, a penal provision, even with civil consequences, \nmust be construed strictly. And ambiguity, if any, must be resolved in the \naffected assessee's favour. \n183. Therefore, we answer the first question to the effect that Goa \nDourado Promotions and other cases have adopted an approach more in \nconsonance with the statutory scheme. That means we must hold that \nKaushalya does not lay down the correct proposition of law. \nQuestion No. 2: Has Kaushalya failed to discuss the aspect of 'prejudice'? \n184. Indeed, Kaushalya did discuss the aspect of prejudice. As we have \nalready noted, Kaushalya noted that the assessment orders already \ncontained the reasons why penalty should be initiated. So, the assessee, \nstresses Kaushalya, \"fully knew in detail the exact charge of the Revenue \nagainst him\". For Kaushalya, the statutory notice suffered from neither \nnon-application of mind nor any prejudice. According to it, \"the so-called \nambiguous wording in the notice [has not] impaired or prejudiced the \nright of the assessee to a reasonable opportunity of being heard\". It went \nonto observe that for sustaining the plea of natural justice on the ground \nof absence of opportunity, \"it has to be established that prejudice is \ncaused to the concerned person by the procedure followed\". Kaushalya \ncloses the discussion by observing that the notice issuing \"is an \nadministrative device for informing the assessee about the proposal to \nlevy penalty in order to enable him to explain as to why it should not be \ndone\". \n185 No doubt, there can exist a case where vagueness and ambiguity in \nthe notice can demonstrate non-application of mind by the authority \nand/or ultimate prejudice to the right of opportunity of hearing \ncontemplated under section 274. So asserts Kaushalya. In fact, for one \nassessment year, it set aside the penalty proceedings on the grounds of \nnonapplication of mind and prejudice. \n186. That said, regarding the other assessment year, it reasons that the \nassessment order, containing the reasons or justification, avoids \nprejudice to the assessee. That is where, we reckon, the reasoning \nsuffers. Kaushalya's insistence that the previous proceedings supply \njustification and cure the defect in penalty proceedings has not met our \nacceptance. \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 42 :: \n \nQuestion No. 3: What is the effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Dilip \nN. Shroff on the issue of non-application of mind when the irrelevant \nportions of the printed notices are not struck off ? \n187 In Dilip N. Shroff, for the Supreme Court, it is of \"some significance \nthat in the standard Pro-forma used by the assessing officer in issuing a \nnotice despite the fact that the same postulates that inappropriate words \nand paragraphs were to be deleted, but the same had not been done\". \nThen, Dilip N. Shroff, on facts, has felt that the assessing officer himself \nwas not sure whether he had proceeded on the basis that the assessee \nhad concealed his income or he had furnished inaccurate particulars. \n188. We may, in this context, respectfully observe that a contravention of \na mandatory condition or requirement for a communication to be valid \ncommunication is fatal, with no further proof. That said, even if the notice \ncontains no caveat that the inapplicable portion be deleted, it is in the \ninterest of fairness and justice that the notice must be precise. It should \ngive no room for ambiguity. Therefore, Dilip N. Shroff disapproves of the \nroutine, ritualistic practice of issuing omnibus show-cause notices. That \npractice certainly betrays nonapplication of mind. And, therefore, the \ninfraction of a mandatory procedure leading to penal consequences \nassumes or implies prejudice. \n189. In Sudhir Kumar Singh, the Supreme Court has encapsulated the \nprinciples of prejudice. One of the principles is that \"where procedural \nand/or substantive provisions of law embody the principles of natural \njustice, their infraction per se does not lead to invalidity of the orders \npassed. Here again, prejudice must be caused to the litigant, \"except in \nthe case of a mandatory provision of law which is conceived not only in \nindividual interest but also in the public interest\". \n190. Here, section 271(1)(c) is one such provision. With calamitous, \nalbeit commercial, consequences, the provision is mandatory and brooks \nno trifling with or dilution. For a further precedential prop, we may refer \nto Rajesh Kumar v. CIT [(2007) 2 SCC 181], in which the Apex Court has \nquoted with approval its earlier judgment in State of Orissa v. Dr. \nBinapani Dei [AIR 1967 SC 1269]. According to it, when by reason of \naction on the part of a statutory authority, civil or evil consequences \nensue, principles of natural justice must be followed. In such anevent, \nalthough no express provision is laid down on this behalf, compliance with \nprinciples of natural justice would be implicit. If a statue contravenes the \nprinciples of natural justice, it may also be held ultra vires Article 14 of \nthe Constitution. \n191. As a result, we hold that Dilip N. Shroff treats omnibus show-cause \nnotices as betraying non-application of mind and disapproves of the \npractice, to be particular, of issuing notices in printed form without \ndeleting or striking off the inapplicable parts of that generic notice. \n13. The Ld. CIT-DR has relied on the decision of Hon’ble High Court of \nMadras in the case of Gangotri Textiles Ltd. V/s DCIT (121 Taxmann.com \n171) which is distinguishable on facts. In this case, it was the findings \nthat the assessee had understood the notices well and filed replies \ncontesting the levy of penalty. The legal ground assailing defect in notice \nwas raised for the first time before Hon’ble High Court and therefore, \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 43 :: \n \nHon’ble Court declined to entertain the same However, the same is not \nthe case here. \n14. Another decision as cited by Ld. CIT-DR is the decision of Hon’ble \nHigh Court of Madras in Sundaram Finance Ltd. Vs ACIT (93 \nTaxmann.com 250) against which the assessee’s SLP has already been \ndismissed by Hon’ble Supreme Court which is reported at 99 \nTaxmann.com 152. We find that this decision has already been \ndistinguished by Hon’ble High Court of Madras in Babuji Jacob Vs. lTO \n(supra) as under:- \n32. The decision of this Court in the case of Sundaram Finance Ltd., was \ncouched on a different factual position wherein the Court rejected the \nplea of the assessee, which was a limited company, when they raised an \nargument with regard to the validity of the notice for the first time before \nthe High Court and considering the administrative set up of the said \nassessee and the fact that the assessee was never prejudiced on account \nof the alleged defect, the Court rejected the argument of the assessee. \n33. In the case on hand, we find that at the first instance, while replying \nto the penalty show cause notice dated 30-3-2016, the assessee raised a \nspecific plea that there was no concealment of income, that he had not \nfurnished inaccurate particulars of income and that the notice was not \nproper. Therefore, the phraseology, which was adopted by the assessee, \nif read as a whole, would clearly show that he had objected to the \nissuance of the notice and as there was no basis for issuance of the notice \nunder section 271(1)(c) of the Act, both limbs in the said provision do not \nget attracted. Hence, the decision of this Court in the case of Sundaram \nFinance Ltd., cannot be applied. Therefore, the ratio of this decision could \nnot be applied in the present case. \n15. In the light of aforesaid legal position, since no specific charge was \nframed either in the show-cause notice or in the body of penalty order \nand there was failure on the part of Ld. AO to frame specific charge \nagainst the assessee, the penalty would not be sustainable in the eyes of \nlaw. By deleting the impugned penalty, we allow the appeal. \nConsequently, going into the merits of the penalty has been rendered \nacademic in nature. \n16. Similar are the facts in all the other years and impugned order is \ncommon order for all the years. The show-cause notices as well as \npenalty orders are substantially on the same line except for change in \nfigures. The penalty, upon confirmation by Ld. CIT(A), is in further appeal \nbefore us. Facts being pari-materia the same as in AY 1998-99, the \npenalty for all these years stand deleted on legal grounds. All the appeals \nstand allowed on similar lines. \n18. The assessee had also relied upon the decision of ITAT Chennai \nBenches in the case of Shri R. Sathiamurthy in ITA No.2197/Chny/2016 \norder dated 25.05.2022, wherein, the Tribunal under identical set of facts \nheld as under: \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 44 :: \n \n6. We noted that this issue has been considered by the Hon'ble \nKarnataka High Court in the case of CIT vs, Manjunatha Cotton and \nGinning Factory, (2013) 359 ITR 565 in great detail wherein the defect in \nnotice is treated as jurisdictional issue. Even the Hon'ble Bombay High \nCourt, Full Bench in the case of Mr. Mohd. Farhan A. Shaikh, supra, has \nconsidered exactly an identical issue. Even the Jurisdictional High Court in \nthe cases of Babuji Jacob, supra and Original Kerala Jewellers, supra has \nconsidered identical situation and held that the very initiation of penalty \nproceedings on a defective notice is invalid and it do not warrant imposition \nof penalty u/s.271(l)(c) of the Act on the assessee. \n7. As the issue of defect in notice i.e., jurisdictional issue, by the present \nassessee, being individual, raised before CIT(A) for the first time and the \nCIT(A) simpliciter rejected the plea of the assessee by observing in para \n7.3 as under:-' \n\"7.3 The content of the entire assessment order itself is sufficient \nreason for initiating penalty proceedings u/s.271(l)(c); the AO has \nduly initiated penalty proceedings in the Assessment Order itself; \nhence, there is no need to record reasons for initiating penalty \nproceedings. Accordingly, ground No. 5 is also rejected.\" \nIt means that the assessee is vigilant from the beginning and raised this \nissue of defect in notice for the first time before CIT(A) and assessee being \nindividual, the issue is squarely covered by the decision of Jurisdictional \nHigh Court in the case of Babuji Jacob, supra, and hence, we delete the \npenalty and allow the appeal of assessee. \n19. In this view of the matter and considering the facts and \ncircumstances of the case, we are of the considered view that show cause \nnotice issued by the AO notice u/s.274 r.w.s.271(1)(c) of the Act is vague \nin nature which does not specify under which limb penalty proceedings \nu/s.271(1)(c) of the Act are initiated. Therefore, we are of the considered \nview that show cause notice issued by the AO and consequent penalty \norder passed u/s.271(1)(c) of the Act is void ab initio and liable to be \nquashed and thus, we quashed show cause notice issued notice u/s.274 \nr.w.s.271(1)(c) of the Act, dated 26-07-2021 and consequent penalty \norder passed by the AO u/s.271(1)(c) of the Act dated 31.03.2022. \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 45 :: \n \n20. \nIn \nthe \nresult, \nappeal \nfiled \nby \nthe \nassessee \nin \nITA \nNo.1164/Chny/2023 for AY 2015-16 is allowed. \nITA No.1165/Chny/2023 for AY 2016-17: \n21. \nThe facts and issues involved in this appeal are identical to the facts \nand \nissues \nwhich \nwe \nhad \nalready \nbeen \nconsidered \nin \nITA \nNo.1164/Chny/2023 for the AY 2015-16. The reasons given by us in the \npreceding paragraphs No. 12 – 19 shall, mutatis mutandis, apply to \nthis appeal, as well. Therefore, for similar reasons, we quashed show \ncause notice issued by the AO u/s.274 r.w.s.271(1)(c) of the Act, dated \n26-07-2021 and consequent order passed by the AO imposing penalty \nu/s.271(1)(c) of the Act dated 31/03/2022. \n22. \nIn \nthe \nresult, \nappeal \nfiled \nby \nthe \nassessee \nin \nITA \nNo.1165/Chny/2023 for AY 2016-17 is allowed. \n23. \nAs \na \nresult, \nappeals \nfiled \nby \nthe \nassessee \nin \nITA \nNo.1164/Chny/2023 & ITA No.1165/Chny/2023 for AYs 2015-16 & 2016-\n17 are allowed. \n \nOrder pronounced on the 06th day of March, 2024, in Chennai. \nSd/- \n(मनोमोहन दास) \n(MANOMOHAN DAS) \n\rाियक सद\t/JUDICIAL MEMBER \n \nSd/- \n(मंजूनाथा. जी) \n (MANJUNATHA.G) \nलेखा सद\t/ACCOUNTANT MEMBER \n \nचे\tई/Chennai, \n\u001bदनांक/Dated: 06th March, 2024. \nTLN \n \n\nITA Nos.1164 & 1165/Chny/2023 \n \n:: 46 :: \n \nआदेश क\u001a \u0017ितिलिप अ\u001fेिषत/Copy to: \n1. अपीलाथ\u0016/Appellant \n3. आयकरआयु\"/CIT \n5. गाड\u000eफाईल/GF \n2. \u0017\u0018यथ\u0016/Respondent \n4.िवभागीय\u0017ितिनिध/DR \n \n \n"
Expert summary
asdasdasdsadas
